Hydroxyferroroméite, a new secondary weathering mineral from Oms, France

Hydroxyferroroméite, ideally (Fe2+ 1.5[]0.5)Sb5+ 2O6(OH), is a new secondary mineral from the Correc d'en Llinassos, Oms, Pyrénées-Orientales Department, France. Hydroxyferroroméite occurs as yellow to yellow-brown powdery boxwork replacements up to about 50μm across after tetrahedrite in a siderite–quartz matrix. No distinct crystals have been observed. The empirical formula (based on 7 (O + OH) per formula unit, pfu) is (Fe2+ 1.07Cu2+ 0.50Zn0.03Sr0.03Ca 0.01[]0.36)Σ2 (Sb5+ 1.88Si0.09Al0.02As0.01)Σ2 O6 ((OH)0.86 O0.14). X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy was used to determine the valence states of Sb, Fe and Cu. Hydroxyferroroméite crystallises in the space group Fd3 m with the pyrochlore structure and hence is a new Fe2+ -dominant member of the roméite group of the pyrochlore supergroup. It has the unit-cell parameters: a = 10.25(3) Å, V = 1077(6) Å3 and Z = 8. A model, based on bond-valence theory, for incorporation of the small Fe2+ cation into a displaced variant of the A site of the pyrochlore structure is proposed.The attached document is the author(’s’) final accepted/submitted version of the journal article. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it

Fast Near Collision Attack on the Grain v1 Stream Cipher

Modern stream ciphers often adopt a large internal state to resist various attacks, where the cryptanalysts have to deal with a large number of variables when mounting state recovery attacks. In this paper, we propose a general new cryptanalytic method on stream ciphers, called fast near collision attack, to address this situation. It combines a near collision property with the divide-and-conquer strategy so that only subsets of the internal state, associated with different keystream vectors, are recovered first and merged carefully later to retrieve the full large internal state. A self-contained method is introduced and improved to derive the target subset of the internal state from the partial state difference efficiently. As an application, we propose a new key recovery attack on Grain v1, one of the $7$ finalists selected by the eSTREAM project, in the single-key setting. Both the pre-computation and the online phases are tailored according to its internal structure, to provide an attack for any fixed IV in $2^{75.7}$ cipher ticks after the pre-computation of $2^{8.1}$ cipher ticks, given $2^{28}$-bit memory and about $2^{19}$ keystream bits. Practical experiments on Grain v1 itself whenever possible and on a 80-bit reduced version confirmed our results

Omsite, (Ni,Cu)_2Fe^(3+)(OH)_6[Sb(OH)_6], a new member of the cualstibite group from Oms, France

Omsite (IMA 2012-025) is a new mineral from the Correc d'en Llinassos, Oms, Pyrénées-Orientales Department, France. It occurs as bright yellow to amber yellow discoidal tablets, flattened on {001}, which form rosettes typically 50–100 μm in diameter. Omsite generally crystallizes on siderite without associated supergene minerals; it occurs less commonly with glaukosphaerite. Crystals have a vitreous to resinous lustre, and are transparent to translucent. Omsite is not fluorescent in either short-wave or long-wave ultraviolet light. It has an estimated hardness of 3 on the Mohs' scale, is brittle with an irregular fracture, and has one poor cleavage on {001}. The calculated density is 3.378 g cm^(−3). Crystals are uniaxial (−), with indices of refraction of ω = 1.728(3) and ε = 1.66(1), measured in white light. Pleochroism is ω = orange-yellow, ε = pale orange-yellow; ω > ε. The empirical formula [based on 12 (OH + Cl) p.f.u.] is (Ni^(2+)_(1.099)Cu^(2+)_(0.665)Mg_(0.107)Fe^(3+)_(0.045) _(Σ1.916)Fe^(3+)_(1.000)(Sb^(5+)_(0.947)As_(0.072)Na_(0.029)_(Σ1.048)OH_(11.967)Cl_(0.033). Omsite crystallizes in space group P3İ, with unit-cell parameters ɑ = 5.3506(8), c = 19.5802(15) Å, V = 485.46(10) Å3 and Z = 2 determined by single crystal X-ray diffraction. The five strongest lines in the X-ray powder diffraction pattern [d in Å, (I_(rel)), (hkl)] are as follows: 4.901, (100), (004); 4.575, (83), (011); 2.3539, (81), (114İ); 1.8079, (48), (118İ); 3.781, (34), (103). The crystal structure was solved to R_1 = 0.0896 for 356 observed reflections [F_o>4σF_o] and 0.1018 for all the 469 unique reflections. Omsite is a layered double hydroxide (LDH) mineral, with a topology consistent with members of the hydrotalcite supergroup and cualstibite group

Improved Linear Cryptanalysis of SOSEMANUK

Abstract. The SOSEMANUK stream cipher is one of the finalists of the eSTREAM project. In this paper, we improve the linear cryptanalysis of SOSEMANUK presented in Asiacrypt 2008. We apply the generalized linear masking technique to SOSEMANUK and derive many linear approximations holding with the correlations of up to 2 −25.5. We show that the data complexity of the linear attack on SOSEMANUK can be reduced by a factor of 2 10 if multiple linear approximations are used. Since SOSEMANUK claims 128-bit security, our attack would not be a real threat on the security of SOSEMANUK. Keywords: Stream Ciphers, Linear Cryptanalysis, SOSEMANUK, SOBER-128.

Improving the Performance of the SYND Stream Cipher

International audience. In 2007, Gaborit et al. proposed the stream cipher SYND as an improvement of the pseudo random number generator due to Fischer and Stern. This work shows how to improve considerably the e ciency the SYND cipher without using the so-called regular encoding and without compromising the security of the modi ed SYND stream cipher. Our proposal, called XSYND, uses a generic state transformation which is reducible to the Regular Syndrome Decoding problem (RSD), but has better computational characteristics than the regular encoding. A rst implementation shows that XSYND runs much faster than SYND for a comparative security level (being more than three times faster for a security level of 128 bits, and more than 6 times faster for 400-bit security), though it is still only half as fast as AES in counter mode. Parallel computation may yet improve the speed of our proposal, and we leave it as future research to improve the e ciency of our implementation

New Treatment of the BSW Sampling and Its Applications to Stream Ciphers

By combining the time-memory-data tradeoff (TMDTO) attack independently proposed by Babbage and Golic (BG) with the BSW sampling technique, this paper explores to mount a new TMDTO attack on stream ciphers. The new attack gives a wider variety of trade-offs, compared with original BG-TMDTO attack. It is efficient when multiple data is allowed for the attacker from the same key with different IVs, even though the internal state size is twice the key size. We apply the new attack to MICKEY and Grain stream ciphers, and improves the existing TMDTO attacks on them. Our attacks on Grain v1 and Grain-128 stream ciphers are rather attractive in the respect that the online time, offline time and memory complexities are all better than an exhaustive key search, and the amount of keystream needed are completely valid. Finally, we generalize the new attack to a Guess and Determine-TMDTO attack on stream ciphers, and mount a Guess and Determine-TMDTO attack on SOSEMANUK stream cipher with the online time and offline time complexities both equal to 2128, which achieves the best time com-plexity level compared with all existing attacks on SOSEMANUK so far

Faster Algorithms for Solving LPN

The LPN problem, lying at the core of many cryptographic constructions for lightweight and post-quantum cryptography, receives quite a lot attention recently. The best published algorithm for solving it at Asiacrypt 2014 improved the classical BKW algorithm by using covering codes, which claimed to marginally compromise the $80$-bit security of HB variants, LPN-C and Lapin. In this paper, we develop faster algorithms for solving LPN based on an optimal precise embedding of cascaded concrete perfect codes, in a similar framework but with many optimizations. Our algorithm outperforms the previous methods for the proposed parameter choices and distinctly break the 80-bit security bound of the instances suggested in cryptographic schemes like HB$^+$, HB$^\#$, LPN-C and Lapin

Dial C for Cipher

We introduce C, a practical provably secure block cipher with a slow key schedule. C is based on the same structure as AES but uses independent random substitution boxes instead of a fixed one. Its key schedule is based on the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudo-random generator, which allows us to prove that all obtained security results are still valid when taking into account the dependencies between the round keys. C is provably secure against several general classes of attacks. Strong evidence is given that it resists an even wider variety of attacks. We also propose a variant of C with simpler substitution boxes which is suitable for most applications, and for which security proofs still hold